drôle de guerre (13. 277)

Though punctuated with sanctions on Nazi Germany and naval blockades, the eight-month period from the invasion of Poland up until the evacuation Dunkirk was referred to the title (en française) by the press or the Phoney War (also Sitzkrieg auf deutsch—earlier in British papers as the “Bore War” though the Americanism came to be preferred so as not to confuse with the Boer War barely a generation removed) for its notable lack of military action on the part of the Allied forces in response, despite extensive war-gaming and drawing up battle plans that became obsolete as Germany continued its expansion with the invasion of France and the Low Countries and the Soviets attacked Finland, hoping that negotiations would lead to peace and appeasement. Allegiances strained and uncoordinated in the current situation prosecuted by US and Israeli forces against Iran and Hezbollah in Lebanon, the reluctance of America’s allies to materially support an offensive campaign peddled in no way to the Gulf states nor partners is understandable and even advisable—given that the foreign policy catastrophe came at a substantive juncture of negotiations between the US and Iran in Geneva and a nuclear deal seemed within reach, talks progressing in the final stages that could have averted conflict that was by no means imminent or inevitable. Whether coerced or bored deal-making, Trump chose violence with global repercussions with no clear off-ramp, as a consequence that was far from unpredictable the world is stymied between TACO and the strategic deficit captured by eighteenth century Prussian military theorist Karl von Clausewitz’ adage that the adversary gets to vote, objectives however poorly defined unmatched by defiance resistant to might.